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SAVING TA LEGOMENA: 
ARISTOTLE AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
CHRISTOPHER P. LONG 
And it is just to feel gratitude not only to those whose opinions 
one shares, but even to those whose pronouncements were more 
superficial, for they too contributed something, since before us 
they exercised the active condition [??t?] of thinking. 
?Metaphysics 1.2.993bll-15 
?_jet US BEGIN WITH Aristotle as Aristotle so often begins with us: by 
attending carefully to the words of the ancients. Xenophanes, who Ar 
istotle so generously claims "made nothing clear,"1 nevertheless gives 
voice to the hope and tragedy of the human condition: "But from the 
beginning the gods did not reveal all things to mortals; but by seeking 
they discover better in time."2 Ours is not a world of superlatives but 
of comparatives?the best, the purest revelation of truth remains con 
cealed to us, and yet, in time, indeed, by searching, we discover better. 
Xenophanes emphasizes the temporality of human striving, and one 
might imagine that this points not merely to the progressive attain 
ment of ever more effective articulations of the truth, but also to the 
cumulative effect past articulations always already have on present at 
tempts to give voice to the nature of things. 
Despite his rather harsh judgment of Xenophanes, Aristotle's own 
words resonate with his: 
The investigation [?eooQ?a] concerning the truth is in one sense diffi 
cult, in another sense easy. A sign of this is that no one can obtain it ad 
equately [to ?if|x' ?^LCO? ^iri??va bvvaoQai], nor do all fail; but each 
Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, College of the Liberal 
Arts, The Pennsylvania State University, 240 Sparks Building, University 
Park, PA 16802-5201. 1 
Aristotle, Aristotelis Metaphysica 1.5.986b23-4, ed. Werner Jaeger 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). Unless otherwise indicated, all 
translations from the Greek are my own. 2 Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., vol. 1 
(Z?rich: Weidmann, 1996), frag. 18, 133. 
The Review of Metaphysics 60 (December 2006): 247-267. Copyright ? 2006 by The Review of 
Metaphysics 
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says something concerning nature [Xiyeiv xi Jte?L xfj? (?y?oe ?], and al 
though one by one each adds little or nothing to it, from all of them be 
ing gathered together something great comes into being.3 
Like Xenophanes, Aristotle begins with human finitude: the ca 
pacity (xo ?vvaoQai) adequately to obtain the truth has not been 
granted to human beings. And yet, like Xenophanes, Aristotle does 
not recoil from this, but insists that something great comes into being 
when the polyphony of articulations concerning nature is assembled. 
Theoretical inquiry into the truth here involves not a detached 
seeing, but an engaged saying. Indeed, truth does not find expression 
in the isolated articulation of a single voice, but rather resonates in a 
polyphony of voices that emerges out of the various ways each en 
gages the world by articulating "something concerning cjyuoic." Thus, 
Aristotle's own investigations into fyvoi? begin by attending to the 
voices of his predecessors. This methodological orientation toward 
x? \Ey?\ieva, the things said, is no idiosyncratic accident. Rather, as 
Wolfgang Wieland has suggested, it is "an integrated moment of the 
objective investigation itself."4 Indeed, this orientation toward the 
things said by those who came before runs throughout Aristotle's 
work, from his investigation into nature, to his treatment of the soul, 
to his inquiry into ethics; for in each case, the investigation into the 
truth begins where we find ourselves, always already addressed by 
the things said by our predecessors. 
In order to apprehend the central methodological role that Aris 
totle's engagement with the things said has for his own attempts to ar 
ticulate the truth, it will be necessary to sketch the basic contours of 
Aristotle's phenomenological approach to x? Xey?\ieva. This will al 
low us first to offer a corrective to what seems to have emerged as a 
kind of received orthodoxy concerning Aristotle's engagement with 
the history of philosophy in which, it is alleged, Aristotle manipulates 
the thinking of his predecessors such that they turn out to be nothing 
other than, as Harold Cherniss so colorfully put it, "'stammering' at 
tempts to express [Aristotle's] own system."5 Yet, in his writings on 
fyvoi? and specifically in the lectures on Physics and the Parts of Ani 
mals, something different is at work. These writings, because they as 
3Metaphysics 2.1.993a30-993b3. 4 
Wolfgang Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik (Goetingen: Vandenho 
eck & Ruprecht, 1970), 101. 5 Harold F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1935), 348. 
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siduously remain loyal to the phenomena with which they are con 
cerned, are able to show the extent to which Aristotle attends to the 
things said by his predecessors, not to legitimize a fully worked out 
position, but rather to locate articulations that open new possibilities 
for thinking and express something of the truth. 
I 
Ta legomena as phainomena. Recent predecessors of our own 
have highlighted the important role saving the ())aiv?|i8va plays in Ar 
istotle's method. In his famous essay, Tithenai ta phainomena, 
G.E.L. Owen identifies what he considers to be an ambiguity in Aristo 
tle's use of the term 
"c|)aiv??ieva."6 In one sense, (j)aiv?^ev(x point to 
empirical observations, in another, to common opinions or ?v?o^a on 
a subject. The first sense seems to operate in the biological works 
when, for example, Aristotle asks in Parts of Animals whether the 
natural philosopher "having first studied the phenomena regarding the 
animals and the parts of each, should then state the reason why and 
the causes."7 The second sense is at work, for example, in Aristotle's 
discussion of axfjaoia, or incontinence, in Nicomachean Ethics 7, 
where he says: 
It is necessary, as with other things, when setting forth the (jxxiv?^ieva 
and having gone through the impasses a first time, to exhibit especially 
all the opinions [ev?o^a] concerning these experiences, or if not [all], 
then most or the most authoritative. For when the difficulties are 
resolved and [certain] opinions remain, it would have been made suffi 
ciently evident.8 
6 G. E. L. Owen, "Tithenai Ta Phainomena," in Aristotle: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, ed. J. M. E. Moravcsik (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 
1967), 168-76. 7 
Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 1.1.639b8-10, trans. James G. Len 
nox, Clarendon Aristotle Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). For 
some other references to the empirical meaning o? phainomena, see On the 
Parts of Animals 1.1.640al3-15; De C?elo 2.13.293a23-30; 2.14.297a2-6; 
3.7.306a5-17; Posterior Analytics 1.13.78b39-79a5; and Metaphysics 
12.8.1073b32-38. 
8 
Aristotle, Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea 7.1.1145b3-7, ed. I. Bywater 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894). The above translation attempts to 
capture the force of two participles, one present (xiO?vxa?), the other aorist 
(?iajtOQT?oavta?;), in the first sentence. It seems important to highlight the 
notion that setting forth the phenomena is an ongoing process that includes 
exhibiting the ev?o^a and perhaps even going through the difficulties a first 
time. 
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Here the ev?o^a, which at the end of the chapter are simply 
called 'xa Xey?jxeva,' themselves function as the (jxxiv?^ieva orienting 
the investigation into incontinence. Drawing on Owen's delineation 
of the different senses of (j)aiv?[xeva in Aristotle, Terence Irwin sug 
gests a distinction between two different methods of inquiry. The 
one, corresponding to the first sense of (jxxiv?jxeva, is empirical; the 
other, corresponding to the second sense, is properly dialectical.9 
John Cleary, however, has taken issue with this bifurcation of Ar 
istotle's method, suggesting that "there is a single common method, 
but that the meaning of 'phenomena' is always relative to the subject 
matter."10 For Cleary, the phenomena play two roles in Aristotle's 
common procedure: they serve as a starting point of the investigation 
and they provide a test for the first principles.11 Cleary rightly traces 
this method back to an ancient practice in astronomy?and if Simpli 
cius is to be believed, it was a practice initiated by Plato12?which in 
volved 
"saving the c|)aiv??ieva" by developing a mathematical account 
capable of doing justice to the observed movements of the heavenly 
bodies. Although this original meaning of ((xxivo^ievot remains identifi 
able in Aristotle's work, particularly in the De C?elo and Metaphysics 
12.8, where an attempt to save the phenomena led Aristotle to enter 
tain the possibility that there were, in fact, forty-seven unmoved mov 
ers,13 Aristotle's own use of the term points to an even broader mean 
ing than has been suggested to this point. 
Cleary points to this broader understanding of 4>aiv?|ieva when 
he recognizes that Aristotle not only uses the term to refer to empiri 
cal observations and received ev?o?a, but more generally, and to 
modern ears, more strangely, takes linguistic evidence itself as a kind 
of (j)aiv??i?va. Cleary notes a passage from the De C?elo that draws 
our attention to the intimate relationship between X,?yoc and the 
9 Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), 29-30. Irwin admits, however, that the "distinction between dialecti 
cal and empirical argument is admittedly rough, and does not imply that the 
same work cannot include both types of argument" (30). 10 John J. Cleary, 'Phainomena in Aristotle's Methodology," Interna 
tional Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, no. 1 (1994): 90, n. 13. 11 
Ibid, 61. 12 
Simplicius, In De cael. 488.18-24, 493. For a discussion of the prob 
lems with this, see J?rgen Mittelstrass, Die Rettung Der Ph?nomene: Urs 
prung Und Geschichte Eines Antiken Forschungsprinzips (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 1962). 
13Meta. 12.8.1074al-17. For an indication of the relevant passages from 
De C?elo, see note 7 above. 
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cjxnv?^ieva as Aristotle considers the nature of a fifth element that had 
long been posited as the material of the heavenly bodies. Aristotle 
claims: 
It seems that our Ji?yoc bears witness to the cj)aiv??j,evcx and that the 
(|)aiv?|i?va bear witness to our X?yoc-It seems that the name [for the 
primary heavenly body] too has been handed down right to our own day 
from the ancients who have taken it up in the way that we too are ex 
pressing. ... And so, saying that the primary body is something other be 
yond earth, fire, air and water, they gave the highest place the name of 
aether [a?6r|Q], positing the name for it from [the fact that] it 'runs al 
ways' [?eiv aet] for an eternity of time.14 
Leaving the question of the validity of the etymology to one side, 
Cleary claims that this passage "shows that language is one of the rele 
vant phenomena for Aristotle because he sees it as a repository of 
truth that can be drawn on by each generation."15 Although the pas 
sage does suggest that language can be viewed as a sort of c|)aiv??i?va 
pointing in the direction of the truth for Aristotle, Cleary's statement 
does not do justice to the extent to which X,?yoc itself serves as a 
(jxxiv?^ievov for Aristotle. 
It is not just that X?yoc serves as a "repository of truth" for Aristo 
tle, but more fundamentally, the truth of beings is only accessible for 
human beings as mediated by ^?yoc. Owen seems to begin to express 
something like this when he writes: "[T]he A,ey?|i?va turn out as so of 
ten to be partly matters of linguistic usage or, if you prefer, of the con 
ceptual structure revealed by language."16 Martha Nussbaum comes 
closer when she claims: "We can have truth only inside the circle of 
appearances, because only there can we communicate, even refer, at 
all."17 Yet even these statements fail to do justice to the extent to 
which in Aristotle 
^?yoc itself serves as a (?xiiv?^evov. 
Aristotle operates with a naturalistic conception of the relation 
ship between being and language that allows him to recognize that our 
14 De Cael. 1.3.270M-24. See Aristotle, Du Ciel, ed. and trans. Paul 
Moraux (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1965). Translation is mine, from the 
Greek. See Meteor. 1.3.339b20: "It appears to be an old belief and one which 
men have held in the past, for the word 'aether' has long been used to denote 
that element." This translation from the Meteorology is from Jonathan Bar 
nes, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 
1, Bollingen Series (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 556. 15 
Cleary, 'Phainomena in Aristotle's Methodology," 71. 16 
Owen, "Tithenai Ta Phainomena," 170. 17 Martha Craven Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 257. 
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very speaking about beings reveals something of the nature of these 
beings themselves.18 Here there is no unbridgeable chasm between 
language and being to traverse. Wieland puts it this way: "The lan 
guage-thing [Sprache-Sache] distinction is an opposition of reflection; 
phenomenologically it does not exist in the natural attitude: in speak 
ing we always already have to do with the things of which we speak 
without ourselves being conscious of the opposition between lan 
guage and things."19 Expressing the point more boldly, Wieland 
writes: 
"every ov is an ov A,?y??ievov."20 Or, to put it in John Herman 
Randall's language: "Things are what they can be said to be."21 Yet, 
these formulations must not be misunderstood as collapsing being 
into being-said; rather, they express the belonging-together of being 
and articulation?they say, to use John Smith's vocabulary, that "ar 
ticulation is not alien to being."22 
For Aristotle, each attempt to express something of the truth 
about beings is always already involved with the very beings it en 
counters. To presume a fundamental disjunction between articula 
tion and being is to impose a distinction of reflection upon a natural 
relationship and so already to pervert it. This is, it seems, a symptom 
of the lasting hegemony of the modern segregation of the object from 
the subject.23 Aristotle's thoroughgoing naturalism undermines the 
assumption of a separation between being and articulation. For Axis 
18 For Aristotle, the being of nature and the human capacity for articula 
tion belong together; human-being, as the being with X?yoc, is itself a natural 
being whose capacity for articulation is one of the ways nature expresses it 
self. This naturalistic conception of language is beautifully expressed by 
Frederick Woodbridge: "But [Aristotle] will not let the naturalness of lan 
guage be natural in admission only. He makes it natural in nature. It be 
comes one of nature's supreme products, the product in which all other 
products find articulated linkage. For things to go into language is a going, 
just as much of a going on their part, and just as natural, as their going into 
air or water, up or down, or from seed to flower." Frederick Woodbridge, Ar 
istotle's Vision of Nature, ed. John Herman Randall (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1965), 24. 19 
Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik, 145. See p. 141: "One has with 
speaking, phenomenologically understood, not to do with the linguistic, but 
rather indeed, with the things of which one speaks, without oneself knowing 
that it thereby concerns itself with things of which one speaks." 20 
Ibid, 201. 21 John Herman Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1960), 118. 22 John E. Smith, "Being, Immediacy, and Articulation," The Review of 
Metaphysics 24 (1971): 594. 
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totle, although there remains a discernible difference between being 
and appearing, there is no sphere of pure being independent of the 
world of appearance and articulation.24 Access to being is gained by 
attending to x? c()aiv??i?va. Thus, when Aristotle characterizes the 
proper method of his investigation into nature, he speaks not of the di 
rect intuitive grasp of separately existing realities, but of a "natural 
road" from what is more known to us to what is more known by na 
ture.25 This road begins with the natural ways in which we and our 
predecessors speak about beings, because these expressions articu 
late something of the truth of the beings themselves. The intuition un 
derlying this phenomenological approach to x? A,ey??ieva is not 
merely that an orientation toward language can give us insight into the 
nature of beings, but that the being of beings naturally expresses itself 
through and in ?-oyo?. From this perspective, Aristotle's collection 
and criticism of the things said by his predecessors must be heard not 
as a prolegomenon to the investigation into nature, but as an integral 
moment of the investigation itself. 
II 
The path of inquiry. Although the tendency to begin with the 
things said by his predecessors runs throughout Aristotle's work, the 
23 
Heidegger has recognized how inappropriate it is to import the sub 
ject/object distinction back into ancient Greek thinking. See Martin Heideg 
ger, Grundbegriffe Der Aristotelischen Philosophie, ed. Mark Michalski, vol. 
18, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 2002), 56. 24 Randall gets at something of the Aristotelian conception of naturalism 
when he writes of the position of the so-called "new naturalism": "The world 
is not really 'nothing but' something other than it appears to be: it is what it is, 
in all its manifold variety, with all its distinctive activity." See John Herman 
Randall, "Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism," in Naturalism and the Hu 
man Spirit, ed. Yervant Hovhannes Krikorian (New York: Columbia Univer 
sity Press, 1944), 361. The distinctive activities of the world are accessible to 
human A,oyo?, but neither reducible to it nor violated by it. Vincent Colapi 
etro puts it this way: "The crucial point is that articulation is neither some 
thing to which being is subjected by forces utterly alien to it nor a process in 
which being plays the role of a ventriloquist and we that of dummies." See 
Vincent Colapietro, "Striving to Speak in a Human Voice: A Peircean Contri 
bution to Metaphysical Discourse," The Review of Metaphysics 58 (2004): 
367, n. 2. 25 
Aristotle, Aristotelis Physica 1.1.184al6-18, ed. David Ross (Oxford, 
England: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
254 CHRISTOPHER LONG 
first chapter of the Physics eloquently expresses the methodological 
intuition that animates the practice. It starts by insisting that that "x? 
et??vca" and "x? emoxao?ai" begin with a kind of "yvcoQ?^eiv"?a fa 
miliar acquaintance with the first principles and causes of the beings 
of nature. Here, two of the highest forms of knowledge in Aristotle, 
ei??vai?knowing in the sense of directly seeing the look or ei?o? of 
something?and emoxao0ai?demonstrative, scientific knowledge? 
are said to be themselves somehow dependent on, indeed to grow out 
of, the familiarity with beings that orients us toward the world in 
which we find ourselves. The beings of nature are prereflectively 
there for us?we have a kind of pre-understanding of them that serves 
as a condition for the possibility of both x? ei??vai and x? 
?jtioxao0ai.26 
Aristotle emphasizes the importance of the sort of recognition as 
sociated with yvooQL^eiv when he asserts: "[I]t is necessary to lead for 
ward in this way: from what is less clear by nature but more clear to 
us to what is clearer and better known [yv(DQi?i(?x?Qa] by nature."27 
The beings with which we are familiar, however, are at first somehow 
jumbled together [ouyxexi^?va]; we perceive them as undifferenti 
ated wholes, while the rich contours of their natural being remains 
hidden. "Thus," Aristotle tells us, "it is necessary to proceed from the 
universal [ex xc?v xa0?Xou] to the particulars [x? xaO' ?xaoxa]; for 
the whole is better known [yva)QL|ita)X8Qa] according to perception, 
and what is universal is some kind of whole."28 Strangely enough, this 
passage seems at odds with Aristotle's general tendency to associate 
particulars with perception and to identify the proper path of investi 
gation as proceeding from particulars to universals, rather than the 
other way around.29 Here, however, the xaB?^ou does not name the 
universal so much as the sort of undifferentiated whole we encounter 
in our everyday engagements with the world. From this perspective, 
x? xa9' exaaxa does not designate "the particulars" so much as, to 
use Heidegger's poignant formulation, "those moments that bring 
what is at first superficially meant into a compelling distance so that I 
actually see it in its articulateness."30 For Heidegger, as for Aristotle, 
the movement from that which is more familiar to us, though less 
26 Wieland uses the vocabulary of "Vorverst?ndnis" in this context. See 
Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik, 72. 
27Phys. 1.1.184al8-21. 28 Ibid. 1.1.184a23-4. 
29 
See, for example, De An. 2.5.417b20-25; Meta. 13.10.1087al2 and Post. 
Anal. 1.2.72a4-6. 
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known by nature, to that which is more known by nature, is a matter 
of articulation. 
This can be heard in the two examples to which Aristotle appeals 
at the end of the first chapter of the Physics. The first example, taken 
from the sphere of geometry, points to the relationship between a 
name and its A,oyo?, or meaning. "A name," says Aristotle, "signifies 
some whole indistinctly, such as a circle, but the definition [ qiojio?] 
takes it apart into particulars [?ia?Qe? x? xa0' ?xaoxa]."31 Here the 
definition is a matter of a sort of ?ia?Qeoi?; not, to be sure, the 
?ia?Qeoi? that divides something according to a hierarchy of genera 
and species, but rather, a ?ia?Qeoi? that literally articulates the undif 
ferentiated beings of natural experience.32 The nature of this sort of 
articulation is reinforced by Aristotle's second example: "And children 
too at first address all men as father and all women as mother, but 
later distinguish [?ioQ??ei] each of them."33 The investigation into na 
ture is oriented at first by the beings that are closest to us; from out of 
this orientation toward the familiar, we somehow grow into an under 
standing of the world by learning how to articulate the proper bound 
aries and limits of the beings we encounter. The child at first speaks 
poorly, because she has not taken hold of the proper limits of beings; 
yet she also speaks beautifully, because in attempting to articulate 
something about the beings she encounters, she speaks the truth?all 
men are in a certain way father, and all women, mother. 
If the path from what is more known to us to what is more known 
by nature takes its orientation from the manner in which the beings of 
nature are themselves articulated, and, indeed, if each attempt to ar 
ticulate something true about the beings with which we are concerned 
itself contributes something to the truth, it is no surprise that Aristo 
tle's own investigation into (jyuoi? begins, not with empirical observa 
tions, but with an engagement with the things said by his 
30 
Heidegger, Grundbegriffe Der Aristotelischen Philosophie, 38. 
Heidegger defends this understanding of x? xa6' ?xacrxa by suggesting that 
the 
"?xa?" refers to a certain "distance" (ibid, 32). The conceptual origins of 
the movement from durchschnittliche Allt?glichkeit, average everydayness, 
to Eigentlichkeit, authenticity, that plays such an important role in Sein und 
Zeit may be traced back to Heidegger's early engagement with the first chap 
ter of the Physics presented in these 1924 lectures. 
slPhys. 1.1.184bl-3. 32 For a discussion of the difference between this notion of ?iatQeoi? 
and that found in Plato's Sophist and Statesman, see Wieland, Die Aristo 
telische Physik, 87. 
33Phys. 1.1.184b3-5. 
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predecessors. Yet for Aristotle, and to the chagrin of many preso 
cratic philologists, this turn to the past is never undertaken with the 
intention of loyally reconstructing the thought of the past. Rather, Ar 
istotle's own philosophical questions lead him to the things said by his 
predecessors. The articulations of the past are neither convenient 
places to begin, nor preliminary introductions to the general nature of 
the problem, but rather the very site from which philosophy must be 
gin. Aristotle pauses to listen to his predecessors because he recog 
nizes that we are always already determined by the history in which 
we are embedded, that our thinking is inherently an inherited 
thinking and that our questions find faint responses, barely dis 
cernable echoes, that resonate in the voices of the past. 
Aristotle's own thinking emerges out of a dynamic dialogue with 
the past, the structure of which is eloquently expressed by Randall 
when he writes of "a 
'dialogue' in which the future asks questions of 
the past embodied in the present, and the present replies?by generat 
ing a new philosophy."34 Our inquisitive engagement with the beings 
that address us at once inherits a determinate past and opens a possi 
ble future. The future itself addresses us in our encounters with be 
ings, demands an account, indeed, accountability: a dialogical articu 
lation that attempts to put beings into words, recognizing both their 
ineffability and their yearning for articulation. We exist precisely as 
such a dialogue with beings, always already determined by past artic 
ulations, never yet capable of fully adequate expressions, held ac 
countable by the beings that address us, demanding an account. 
This dialogue cannot be oriented by an attempt simply to recon 
struct the thought of past thinkers. Rather it emerges from a genuine 
philosophical engagement with the world, indeed, from a primordial 
kind of questioning. It is not, as Harold Cherniss has suggested, that 
Aristotle simply uses these theories to establish "artificial debates 
which he sets up to lead 'inevitably' to his own solutions."35 Such a 
position presumes that Aristotle's ?i?0o?oi express an already worked 
out system, indeed, that Aristotle loads the dice as he plays with the 
thinking of his predecessors such that "one theory is set against an 
other in such a manner that each may bring to light the other's diffi 
culties which are then resolved by a reconciliation: this reconciliation 
34 John Herman Randall, How Philosophy Uses Its Past (New York: Co 
lumbia University Press, 1963), 27. 35 Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, xii. 
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is the Aristotelian system."36 Andrea Nightingale seems to agree that 
Aristotle "constructs" his history of philosophy to reinforce and legiti 
mize his own philosophical position.37 Focusing primarily on Aristo 
tle's treatment of his predecessors in Metaphysics 1, she insists that 
his engagement with the history of philosophy is teleologically ori 
ented such that Aristotle's own philosophical system always emerges 
as the clearest, most mature expression of the truth.38 J. Mansfeld 
even goes so far as to suggest that Aristotle must have believed his 
system approximated the final goal closely.39 Catherine Collobert too 
emphasizes the importance of Aristotle's teleology: "A history of phi 
losophy supposes, even implicitly, a philosophy of history, which is, 
for Aristotle, a teleological conception of philosophy's develop 
ment."40 While it is perhaps true that Aristotle's engagement with his 
predecessors is determined by a kind of teleological conception of his 
tory, it is a natural teleology that is oriented by the ^aiv?^ieva 
36 Ibid. 
37 Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek 
Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer 
sity Press, 2004), 26-9. She writes: "The ancients therefore give Aristotle's 
own theoretical activities a venerable pedigree even as they point up his vast 
superiority to the entire tradition" (28). 38 
Ibid, 28. 39 Jaap Mansfeld, Studies in the Historiography of Greek Philosophy 
(Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990), 48. 40 Catherine Collobert, "Aristotle's Review of the Presocratics: Is Aristo 
tle Finally a Historian of Philosophy?" Journal of the History of Philosophy 
40 (2002): 287. Collobert's own orientation to the practice of Aristotle's his 
tory of philosophy allows her to distinguish between Aristotle's "synchronie" 
ordering of the positions of the past in which he puts into perspective con 
flicting points of view in order to find a solution, and a "diachronic" ordering 
in which Aristotle reviews the general movement of a philosophical question 
ending with a solution?confirming a theory (289). This distinction brings 
into focus the difference between Aristotle's approach to his predecessors at 
the beginning of the Metaphysics and his engagement with their thinking in 
the Physics. In the Metaphysics, the things said by his predecessors serve as 
"witnesses" confirming Aristotle's own worked out conception of the four 
causes (see, Me?a.l.7.988bl7). In the Physics, however, past articulations 
emerge as part of a dialogical investigation into the truth of (j)i3oi? itself. Col 
lobert's distinction between "synchronie" and "diachronic" ordering covers 
over the extent to which even the synchronie gathering of positions is part of 
a diachronic engagement with genuine philosophical questions. Collobert's 
insistence that Aristotle's engagement with his predecessors is ultimately ori 
ented by the solutions expressed by Aristotle himself eclipses the degree to 
which Aristotle's own positions emerge from, and as a result of, a deep en 
gagement with the thinking of his predecessors. 
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themselves.41 Such a teleological conception of history resonates 
with Xenophanes's insistence that in time, by searching, we discover 
better. If, however, the teleological structure of history is understood 
to be constructed with an eye toward a telos that stands outside of the 
order itself, it ceases to be natural and becomes artificial. If history 
manifests a natural teleological structure, this can only be discerned 
from within the movement of a history that is itself taken as a phe 
nomenon. The tendency, heard in the things said particularly by Cher 
niss and Mansfeld, to identify Aristotle's approach to his predecessors 
with an artificial teleology eclipses the extent to which Aristotle turns 
to the things said out of an intuitive awareness of his own historicity. 
Aristotle's engagement with the past is not determined by a previ 
ously worked out system, nor is it concerned with a kind of dialectical 
reconciliation of the positions of his predecessors. Rather, Aristotle 
begins with them because he recognizes that they have always already 
begun with him. The past, as Randall suggests, funds the present in 
such a way that whenever it enters into a genuine questioning of be 
ings, it must begin with the sayings of the past; for the future is born in 
and through such sayings. Aristotle's engagement with the past is ori 
ented toward the future?it is guided by an inquisitive engagement 
with the world. "Questions," Gadamer says, "always bring out the un 
determined possibilities of a thing."42 Aristotle's object is not the re 
construction of the thought of those who came before, but the at 
tempt to articulate "the undetermined possibilities" of the beings with 
which he is engaged. Gadamer expresses it this way: "[Understand 
ing is always more than merely re-creating someone else's meaning. 
Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is mean 
ingful passes into one's own thinking on the subject."43 This is pre 
41 
Nightingale rightly points out the biological vocabulary deployed in 
Aristotle's account of his predecessors in Metaphysics 1. This reinforces the 
notion that the teleology that determines Aristotle's understanding of history 
is itself a natural teleology and not a mere construct. However, the impres 
sion that Aristotle constructs the views of his predecessors to legitimize his 
own philosophical position seems largely determined by a limited focus on 
the approach of the first book of the Metaphysics. Yet, there is more to Aris 
totle's engagement of his predecessors than this attempt to legitimize a previ 
ously established position. In the Physics and Parts of Animals, to cite just 
two examples, Aristotle turns to the things said by his predecessors as phe 
nomena that uncover the nature of natural beings. 42 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2d ed. (New York: Contin 
uum, 1994), 375. 
SAVING TA LEGOMEN A 259 
cisely how the most fecund possibilities of Aristotle's thinking 
emerge?in an inquisitive dialogue with the voices of the past. 
Ill 
Saving the things said. Let us listen then, to how Aristotle's own 
engagement with the things said by his predecessors opens up new 
possibilities of thinking in two texts?the Physics and the Parts of 
Animals.u These two texts in particular articulate the phenomeno 
logical orientation toward x? ^ey??ieva at work in so many of Aristo 
tle's inquiries, because they remain guided by an insistent and sus 
tained philosophical interrogation of the being of natural beings. 
The question that orients Aristotle's first approach to the being of 
x? (|)i)oixa concerns the number of their principles. Ironically, Aristo 
tle begins with Parmenides and Melissus who, he claims, cannot have 
spoken at all about nature and its principles, for in asserting that being 
is one, they fail to grasp the meaning of an ?gyr]: "For it is not any 
longer an aQyf\ if it is one only and there is therefore only one thing, 
for an ?gyr] is of something or some things."45 This failure Aristotle 
ascribes to their tendency to speak for the sake of speaking [^?you 
Bvexa 
^eyo^ievov]?that is, they are not able to say something con 
cerning nature precisely because their words do not address the be 
ings of nature. This refusal to direct X-?yoc to beings undermines the 
investigation into nature; indeed, it threatens the very possibility of 
speaking at all. Yet Aristotle calls this limit case the "most appropriate 
beginning" because it allows us to recognize that being is "said in 
more than one way."46 The plurivocity of being is a condition for the 
possibility of the investigation into the principles of nature, for a prin 
ciple is itself always a matter of a certain predication: to function as a 
source of intelligibility, an aQXH must be capable of being said of that 
of which it is the principle. Thus, when Parmenides and Melissus 
43 Ibid. 
44 Our orientation toward these two texts is designed to uncover a meth 
odological approach that is heard throughout Aristotle's work. Thus, these 
two texts are in some sense paradigmatic of Aristotle's overall phenomeno 
logical approach to the things said. The same points could have been made 
by attending carefully to almost any of Aristotle's writings. 
45Pfa/s.l.2.185a3-5. 46 Ibid. 1.2.185a23-4. 
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assert the univocity of being, they deny themselves the possibility of 
making the sorts of distinctions that allow the being of nature to come 
to expression.47 For Aristotle, to assert the absolute oneness of being 
is to assert nothing at all, or perhaps better, it is to show its own im 
possibility because the assertion itself requires the saying of some 
thing as something and therefore already involves a kind of multiplic 
ity. Some particularly zealous followers of Parmenides?worried that 
the same thing might be both one and many?seem to have attempted 
to abolish the 'is' from human language. Others, Aristotle tells us, "re 
fashioned the language so that a human-being 'has whitened' rather 
than 'is white' and 'walks' rather than 'is walking' in order not to make 
the one be many by attaching 'is', as though one or being were said in 
only one way."48 This attempt to reconstruct the language to fit a the 
ory stands for Aristotle as the most appropriate starting point for the 
inquiry into the principles of natural beings, precisely because it 
marks the limit of the possibility of the investigation itself. 
Yet even here at the limit, Aristotle does not abstractly reject the 
things said by his predecessors. Indeed, he begins Physics 1, chapter 
5 by saying: "Everyone makes contraries the aQ%aL"49 Initially, this 
sounds strange, for surely Parmenides and Melissus do not make con 
traries the original beings. However, Aristotle is quick to point out 
that even Parmenides says that the cold and the hot are ??/ai, though 
he calls them "fire and earth."50 In a passage from the Metaphysics 
explicitly linked to this discussion in the Physics, Aristotle claims that 
Parmenides speaks of the principles as two because he is "forced to 
follow the phainomena [?xoXou0e?v xot? 4>aivo?Lt?voic]."51 The at 
tempt to say something about the beings of nature forces Parmenides 
47 Aristotle puts it this way: "But if all beings are one in X,oyo? as a robe 
and a cloak, [Parmenides and Melissus] turn out to assert the Heracleitean 
X?yoc; for being-good and being-bad would be the same, and being-good and 
being-not-good?so that what is good and what is not good would be the 
same, as would a human being and a horse, and their tayyo? would not be 
about the being-one of beings but about the being-nothing [of beings]" (Ibid. 
1.2.185b21-27). 48 Ibid. 1.2.185b28-33 
49 Ibid. 1.5.188al9. 
50 Ibid. 1.5.188a20-21. Aristotle leaves Melissus out here presumably be 
cause the "crudeness" of his thinking precluded him from giving expression 
to the impasses that lead to a genuine encounter with the beings of nature, 
seePhys. 1.2.185al2-15. 51 Meta. 1.5.986b26-987a2. 
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to articulate something of the truth of natural beings, namely, that 
their principles are not simply one, but at least two. That something 
like this must be the case, Aristotle claims, is evident from the things 
said by his predecessors. This consensus omnium serves as a sign of 
the truth of what has been said. Aristotle arrives at the threshold of 
his own philosophical engagement with the beings of nature through 
the things said; for the recognition that contraries somehow serve as 
??%ai provides not only the impetus for, but also the context in which 
Aristotle's own rich analysis of the being and becoming of x? fyvoixa 
develops. Hearing the harmony of voices claiming the central impor 
tance of contraries, Aristotle proceeds to offer an articulation of his 
own in which he translates the vocabulary of contrariety into that of 
opposition and suggests that the becoming of natural beings involves 
the transition from a certain shapelessness to being-shaped. Out of 
this discussion grows the philosophically fecund distinction between 
form and its privation that plays a central role in Aristotle's own artic 
ulation of the being of natural beings. Yet this distinction, along with 
that of the ujtoxeijievov [that which underlies], which itself emerges 
not only from Aristotle's engagement with his predecessors, but also 
from his attention to our common ways of speaking, must themselves 
be heard to grow out of Aristotle's inquisitive dialogue with the things 
said by those who came before.52 
This dialogue is heard as well in the first book of the Parts of An 
imals, in which we find a powerful expression of the central method 
ological importance of x? Xey??ieva. The text begins by insisting that 
"it is the manner of an educated person to be able to judge 
52 Aristotle's method of "saving x? Xey?fxeva" has two interrelated but 
distinct dimensions. The first, outlined in this essay, involves an orientation 
toward the things said by his predecessors. The second, which goes beyond 
the scope of the present essay, but which will be addressed in a forthcoming 
study of Aristotle's phenomenology, orients itself toward the things com 
monly said, toward our common ways of speaking. For Aristotle, such artic 
ulations also express something of the truth of being. See, for example, 
Physics 1.7, where the fundamental ontological distinction between form and 
matter is developed from a consideration of how people speak about becom 
ing (1.7.190a21-190bl). The same methodological orientation toward the 
things commonly said is at work in Metaphysics 7.7 and 9.7, where Aristotle 
points to the alteration of the way we commonly refer to the material element 
of a composite once it has taken on its form?a statue is not bronze, but bra 
zen?to suggest that matter continues to play an ontological role in determin 
ing the being of the composite (see 7.7.1032b32-1033a23 and 9.7.1049al8 
1049b4). 
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successfully what is beautifully said and what is not."53 The question 
concerning the ability to judge what is and is not said beautifully leads 
Aristotle to the one of the most explicit statements of his phenomeno 
logical approach: "[F]irst one should get hold of the phenomena con 
cerning each kind, then state the causes."54 While this statement has 
important implications for how the History of Animals, which phe 
nomenologically gathers the similarities and differences among ani 
mals, relates to the Parts of Animals, which is concerned with ex 
pressing causes based on this collection, it also opens up the question 
concerning the proper response to the "what is it" question. 
For Aristotle, this involves an account of the what-it-was-for 
something-to-be, its xi f)v eivou.55 This, of course, is a technical term in 
Aristotle, and it seems to be deployed here having already been fully 
worked out conceptually. Aristotle himself says later in book 1 of the 
Parts of Animals that his predecessors did not have an understanding 
of "x? xi f|v eivca" and "the capacity to delimit the being of beings [x? 
OQ?oao0ai xi?]v ouo?av]."56 Yet immediately upon opening the question 
concerning x? x? f|v e?va?, Aristotle turns to the words of his predeces 
sors. At first the move is decidedly critical: for the most part, when 
responding to the question concerning what each being is, the ancient 
(j)i)OLXOi appealed to the material origin and failed to consider the 
"that for the sake of which" or the form. For Aristotle, however, this 
is not well said, for when we ask what a desk is, for example, it is not 
enough simply to say "wood." Rather, as Aristotle suggests, we must 
articulate the form [et?o?]; for the desk is a "this in that," (xo?e ?v 
xco?e), or a "this-such" (xo?e xoiov?e).57 The demonstratives here 
seek to articulate the enigmatic nature of composite beings. The lin 
guistic gestures?xo?e ?v x ?e, xo?e xoiov?e?express the distinction 
between form and matter that shows itself in the beings we encoun 
ter. The very attempt to put the beings we address into words forces 
53 Aristotle, Les Parties des Animaux [PA] 1.1.639a4-5, ed. Paul Louis 
(Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1956). Translation is mine, from the Greek. 54 PA 1.1.640al3. 
55 For a discussion of this translation for xt f)v etvai which emphasizes 
the appearance of the imperfect 'f|v', see Christopher P. Long, The Ethics of 
Ontology: Rethinking an Aristotelian Legacy, Suny Series in Ancient 
Greek Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 65, 81 
and 158. 
56 PA 1.1.642a25. 
57 Ibid. 1.1, 640b25. 
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us to recognize that an appeal to matter does not say enough about 
them.58 By addressing them, they speak to us, drawing our attention 
beyond their matter, to their very look?ei?o?. 
Yet the precise manner in which the ei?o? is articulated in this 
text itself says something about the path of Aristotle's thinking. He 
says that in speaking about a bed "it would be necessary to speak 
about the configuration [oxr||iotxo?] and what sort of visible appear 
ance [t??a] it has."59 These words trace a genealogy. Whatever else it 
might suggest, the term "t??a" evokes the thinking of Plato and so, for 
Aristotle, a conception of form as somehow separate from the matter 
from which it has been abstracted. Yet this Platonic "t??a" is said to 
gether with "oxrijxaxo?," a ?-oyo? that pulls in the opposite direction; 
for Aristotle explicitly associates "ox^axo?" with the thinking of 
Democritus, an atomist and materialist, and so draws the "t??a" back 
into relation with its matter. Aristotle's name for this conception of 
form as intimately bound to matter is [xoQ(j)f|. Thus he says: "The na 
ture in respect to shape (^tOQ(()f|) is more important than the material 
nature."60 To hear this statement properly, it is necessary to recall that 
it is made within the context of a corrective of the (?ruoixoi who tried 
to articulate the being of nature exclusively in terms of matter. 
Yet, when Aristotle insists on the importance of ?ioQ(j)r|, he is not 
simply thinking against his predecessors, but with them as well. For 
Aristotle develops his own more robust conception of form as ?iOQ(J)r| 
by attending carefully to the way Democritus speaks: "Now if it is by 
virtue of its configuration [oxn^axo?] and color that each of the ani 
mals and their parts is what it is, Democritus might be speaking cor 
rectly; for he appears to assume this."61 Even if his overall theory of 
atomism is misguided, still Democritus speaks well, for he appears to 
assume (cj)aivexai. . . jtoXa?eiv) that it is by virtue of configuration 
58 What Heidegger delineates as the two dimensions of ?xSyo? are at work 
here: "1. Aoyo?, ?,?yeiv in the sense of to approach and point to something, 
^oyo? in the sense of access; 2. ?-oyo? says also that which is expressed as 
such, it lies in the being that is addressed." See Heidegger, Grundbegriffe 
Der Aristotelischen Philosophie, 212. 59 PA 1.1.640b27-8. 
60 Ibid. 1.1.640b28-9. 
61 Ibid. 1.1.640b29-31. Commenting on this passage, Lennox recognizes 
that "[t]he wording suggests that Aristotle infers Democritus's beliefs from 
what he actually says. He says that it is clear what sort of thing a human is 
because this is known by way of configuration and colour." See Aristotle, On 
the Parts of Animals, 138. 
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that each animal and their parts are what they are. Attending to the 
assumptions in what has been said, to the very manner in which the 
speaking appears, Aristotle hears a way of thinking form as ontologi 
cally efficacious. 
However, Democritus spoke in too unqualified a way [kiav ovv 
?jt?xo? 8?QT]xaL], for appealing to mere shape [oxr\\iaToc] is not 
enough. To make this clear, Aristotle appeals to the example of a 
corpse which, although it maintains the shape of a human-being, no 
longer is what it was precisely because it has ceased to be able to do 
its work. Thus, its being is not merely its ox^iaxo?, the configuration 
of its outward appearance, or even its et?o?, if by this we hear an t??a 
separated from its matter; rather, it is ?i?p(|)r| in its deeper sense as the 
being-at-work of matter. By attending to the way things are said, our 
attention is directed to the very manner in which the being of the be 
ing under consideration is in the world, to its very being-at-work, 
evepyeia. This more robust conception of form, which now must be 
heard together with matter as expressed in the various ways in which 
beings are in their world, leads Aristotle's thinking to the very phe 
nomenality of the phenomena, that is, to their ways of appearing. For 
it is only here, by living and speaking in intimate association with the 
phenomena, that the truth of beings is articulated.62 
IV 
The compulsion of truth. The two texts we have been consider 
ing, the opening passages of the Physics and the Parts of Animals, 
find an echo in one another, for not only do they articulate how x? 
^ey?|Li8va offer access to the truth of beings, but both texts vividly ex 
press the manner in which the truth compels its own articulation. In 
the Physics, after identifying the common agreement that the aQ%ai 
are contraries and considering the meaning of contrariety in this con 
text, Aristotle again returns to the things said by his predecessors: 
For all of them say that the elements and the things they call original be 
ings are contraries, and even though they lay it down without argument 
[aveu X?you], they say [X?yovoiv] it nonetheless, as though compelled 
by the truth itself.63 
62 See De Gen. et Cor. 1.2.316a6-7. 
63Phys. 1.5.188b29-32. 
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Aristotle's dialogue with his predecessors is oriented by and attends 
to a certain kind of X?yoc, not, indeed, the ^?yoc of fully worked out, 
intentional arguments?although there is truth here too?but the 
?-oyo? that emerges from the direct, intimate engagement with beings 
themselves. The things having been said, x? A,ey?jxeva, are (f>aiv?^i?va 
that, when carefully assembled and critically questioned, speak some 
thing of the truth. 
Aristotle's attention to x? A,ey?^eva as (j)aiv??ieva determines his 
engagement with his predecessors. Remarkably, however, Aristotle 
shows little interest in the actual arguments they put forth, nor is he 
much concerned with the content their thinking expresses. Indeed, 
his accounts of their various positions are surprisingly formal. He is 
content to show, for example, that a wide diversity of thinkers?from 
the monist Parmenides to the atomist Democritus, from Empedocles 
to Anaxagoras?have said things that can in a certain sense be heard 
as harmonious. This harmony does not mute dissonance. Aristotle in 
sists: "So they say things that are in a certain way the same as one an 
other, but also different: different in just the way they seem to be to 
most people, but the same to the extent that they are analogous."64 
What appears on the surface as dissonant, reveals a deeper resonance. 
To hear the resonance of truth under the cacophony of voices, Aristo 
tle reflects not so much on the content of the philosophical positions 
of his predecessors as on the form of what they say. This allows Aris 
totle, as Wieland suggests, both to take his predecessors seriously and 
to move beyond them. He can move beyond them because he is less 
concerned with what they say?that is, with the objective content of 
their thought?than with how they say it?that is, with what they 
mean by speaking the way they do. He must take them seriously be 
cause their ways of speaking reveal what is implicitly presupposed 
about the things under consideration.65 For Aristotle, every \6yoq that 
genuinely seeks to say something concerning beings somehow reso 
nates with the truth. 
This is the force of Aristotle's insistence that the truth compels 
his predecessors to speak in certain ways. Yet truth only speaks in the 
things said as the things said speak about things. Two passages at the 
end of the first chapter of the Parts of Animals suggest the link 
64 Ibid. 1.5.188b34-189al. 
65 
Wieland, Die Aristotelische Physik, 143^. 
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between truth and things. "For nature is an origin more than matter. 
Even Empedocles occasionally stumbles upon this, led by the truth it 
self [ jt' a?xfj? xfj? ??J]0eia?], and is forced to say that the ovoia and 
the nature is the X?yoc, for example when he says what bone is."66 
Empedocles speaks the truth when he attempts to articulate what 
bone is. If truth compels us, it is only when our X?yoi are directed to 
ward beings. This is further reinforced a few lines later when Aristo 
tle says that Democritus was the first to touch on the xi f|v eivai "be 
cause he was carried away by the thing itself [ujt' a?xo? xov 
jt??y|iaxo?]."67 In commenting on these two passages, Heidegger 
writes: 
"AXr|0eia and jTQay?ia [things or beings] are here used in the 
same sense, that is, ??T|0?ia is not 'validity' that clings to the sentence 
or some such thing (as a logic gone astray thinks), but rather [aA,f|0eia 
is] nothing other than the being in its uncovering, it is jtQ?y^ia, insofar 
as the being with which I have to do is there in a certain uncovered 
ness [in einer gewisser Entdecktheit]."68 This intimate connection 
between truth and thing emerges from a A,oyo? striving to articulate 
something of the truth of things. As with Aristotle, so with Heidegger, 
much depends on little words. Here, Heidegger's "einer gewisser"?in 
a certain . . . uncoveredness?echoes Aristotle's frequent use of "xi?," 
a certain . . . , to temper the force of a statement when the danger of 
hyperbole looms. The danger here is that of hybris; for "a certain un 
coveredness" is precisely not pure revelation. Truth is revealed 
through X,oyo?. This claim is no renunciation of the limits of X?yoc. 
Rather, it points to those limits and, by extension, to human finitude 
itself. If, as Santayana has a fictional Avicenna remind us, "[natural 
ists are often betrayed by their understanding of origins into a sort of 
inhumanity,"69 we would do well to listen for this tendency in Aristo 
tle, the "greatest naturalist" of all. 
And indeed, such an inhumanity is discernible even in the way 
Aristotle himself appropriates the things said by his predecessors. 
The irony is that the very formalism that allows Aristotle both to take 
his predecessors seriously and to move beyond them involves a sort 
of appropriation, an abstraction from their original context, indeed a 
66 PA 1.1.642al6-20. 
67 Ibid. 1.1.642a28 
68 
Heidegger, Grundbegriffe Der Aristotelischen Philosophie, 240. 69 
George Santayana, Dialogues in Limbo: With Three New Dialogues 
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1957), 243. 
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violence that makes the things said, say things differently. Yet this too 
is a very human inhumanity; for it is an inescapable consequence of 
human historicity. It is a reminder of the finitude of which Aristotle, 
echoing Xenophanes, speaks when he calls the investigation concern 
ing truth difficult. Yet this very recognition humanizes the investiga 
tion; for let us not forget, it is easy to speak the truth. We are natural 
beings and our attempts to articulate the truth about beings will in 
eluctably say something true, but only to the extent that our taSyoi re 
main open to beings themselves. We have, in fact, inherited from Aris 
totle this openness to beings and the e^i? of thinking that makes it 
possible, and he inherited it from his predecessors. For it is a human 
8?l?, an active condition, a way of being in the world that refuses to re 
main content with the surface of things, but seeks to articulate the 
deeper truth of the beings that are at once familiar and elusive.70 
Access to the truth, then, does not require immediate insight into 
the realm of pure Being separate from the world in which we find our 
selves. Yet it does involve a sort of transcendence, not the transcen 
dence of which philosophers have often dreamed, confusing them 
selves with the gods, but finite, human transcendence?the ability to 
step outside oneself by attending to the things said before; for in these 
articulations, the truth resonates. Yet this transcendence is finite, for 
we are limited even as we step outside ourselves, held accountable 
from two directions. On one side are the things said, the very history 
in which we are embedded and from which we speak. On the other 
side stand the things themselves, demanding to be put into words; for 
Aristotle's naturalism tells us at once that beings go into words will 
ingly, and that as an expression of a finite being, each attempted artic 
ulation always leaves more to be said. To take up here at the end what 
was said at the beginning: if we learn how to listen more attentively, 
we too in time might begin to speak more beautifully. And in so 
speaking, "something great comes into being." 
The Pennsylvania State University 
701 owe this formulation to Vincent Colapietro who eloquently writes: 
the best metaphysics is "a continuous striving to speak in a human voice 
about what is most intimately yet elusively familiar, everyday experience in 
its broadest reach and deepest import." Colapietro, "Striving to Speak in a 
Human Voice," 396-7. 
